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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

l

t
Plaintiff/Respondent, i

Case No. 870412

1

VS.

PHILLIP PAUL LAROCCO,

Ii

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant, J

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of Theft of an
Operable Motor Vehicle, a second degree felony, and Possession of
a Stolen Vehicle, a third degree felony after a trial in the
Third Judicial District Court and after this Court granted
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5)
(Supp. 1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Was the warrantless search of a stolen car lawful

where defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy either
because the car was stolen or because there is none in the VIN
number, or, where the officer had probable cause to search?
2.

Was a mistrial warranted where a juror conversed

with a relatively inconsequential witness prior to trial?
3.

Was defendant prejudiced where the record does not

support his contention that two jurors saw him shackled in
custody?

4.

Is possession of a stolen vehicle a lesser included

offense of theft, thus, precluding defendant's conviction of both
crimes under the facts of this case establishing that the theft
and possession were committed on separate dates approximately
four years apart?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Phillip Paul Larocco, was charged in Count I
with theft of an operable motor vehicle, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-404 (1978) and S 76-6-412
(1978), and in Count II with possession of a stolen vehicle, a
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-112
(1981).

Defendant was convicted as charged following a jury

trial held December 9 and 10, 1985, in the Third Judicial
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable David B. Dee, Judge, presiding.

Defendant was

sentenced by Judge Dee on January 10, 1986, to concurrent terms
of one to fifteen years and zero to five years in the Utah State
Prison on counts I and II respectively.
Defendant appealed his convictions to the Utah Court of
Appeals.
27, 1987.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment on August
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 1987).

The

Court of Appeals denied defendant's petition for rehearing on
October 6, 1987.

This Court granted defendant's petition for

writ of certiorari on January 26, 1988.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 16, 1981, defendant approached salesman David
Luce at State Auto Sales in Salt Lake County and asked to take a
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1973 Mach I Mustang for a test drive (R. 187). Defendant had
visited Mr. Luce at the auto dealership on two previous
occasionsf and on each of those occasions they had discussed
Mustangs for about ten to fifteen minutes (R. 187-88).

Because

this was the third time he had met defendant and because there
were no other employees at the dealership at that time, Mr. Luce
permitted defendant to take the car for an unaccompanied test
drive (R. 186-87).

Mr. Luce told defendant that he could take

the car around the block; however, defendant drove off and never
returned (R. 187-88).

Later that day, Mr. Luce or William

Padilla, the owner of State Auto Sales, reported to the police
that the Mustang had been stolen (R. 211 [T. 74]).
Shortly thereafter, defendant was incarcerated in the
Utah State Prison, having been convicted of an unrelated theft
valued at about $90,000 (R. 349). Defendant was released from
prison on February 12, 1985 (R. 348).
In May of 1985, salesman David Luce, who had changed
jobs and was working at Valley Ford in Salt Lake City, saw
defendant at Valley Ford.

Defendant was on the showroom floor

talking with a salesman named Patrick Sullivan.

Mr. Luce took

Mr. Sullivan aside and said, "If that gentleman wants to go for a
ride in a car, • . • you just make damn sure you go with him,
because if you don't you'll not see him again."

(R. 190).

Defendant's incarceration in the Utah State Prison was not
brought to the attention of the jury at trial. The
incarceration, however, is an important factor to consider in
determining whether defendant in this case could be convicted of
both theft and possession of a stolen vehicle, as addressed in
Point IV.
-3-

Defendant had given Mr. Sullivan a false name and address; he
said his name was Phillip Wilson and that he lived at 7442
Gardenia Avenue, a street number which did not exist (R. 31, 192,
214-15).
About three or four days later, Mr. Luce saw defendant
at 39th South State, driving the Mustang that he had stolen from
State Auto Sales in 1981 (R. 191). Mr. Luce called his former
employer, William Padilla, and told him that he had seen the
stolen Mustang, and Mr. Luce gave Padilla the name and address
that defendant had given to the salesman at Valley Ford (R. 19192, 214). Mr. Padilla could not find the street number that had
been given him by Mr. Luce.

However, after looking around the

area, Mr. Padilla found the Mustang parked on a street a few
blocks away (R. 215). Mr. Padilla wrote down the license number
and called the police (R. 215, 230).
A few days later, Detective Linda Robison went to the
location where Mr. Padilla had seen the Mustang (R. 230-31).
Detective Robison found the Mustang parked in front of
defendant's home; she checked the license plate and found that
the car was registered to defendant (R. 232-33).

Detective

Robison checked the vehicle identification number ("VIN") that
was listed on the car registration and found that the VIN was
assigned to a 1973 Mustang that had been registered to Neil
Hailes (R. 233). Mr. Hailes' Mustang had been completely
destroyed in a car wreck on Christmas Eve of 1975, and the
wrecked remains of the car were taken to a wrecking yard in Salt
Lake County (R. 250-55).
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On June 6, 1985, Detective Robison returned to the
location she had previously seen the Mustang, accompanied this
time by another officer and by Kip Ingersoll, an investigator
with the Department of Motor Vehicles (R. 234). While standing
outside the vehicle, the officers examined the VIN tag on the
dashboard; the number was the same as the VIN belonging to Mr.
Hailes wrecked Mustang (R. 252-37).

The officers then opened the

door of the car in order to observe the VIN located on the safety
standard sticker; the sticker was located on the right side panel
of the driver's door (R. 235-37, 244; Exhibit 1).

This VIN was

different from the VIN on the dashboard; the VIN on the door
panel matched the VIN of the Mustang stolen from State Auto Sales
(R. 235).
Upon finding that the VIN on the safety standard
sticker matched that of the stolen Mustang, the officers went to
defendant's home, read him his Miranda rights, and arrested him
(R. 238-40).

Defendant told Detective Robison that he had

purchased the car from Streater Chevrolet (R. 33, 239).
Defendant's brother-in-law gave the officers the fraudulent
certificate of title and the car was impounded (R. 240-41).
Upon further investigation, Kipp Ingersoll found that
the VIN tag on the dashboard had been affixed with tin foil and
glue (R. 270-71).

He also examined a secretly located derivative

number (a slightly shortened form of the VIN) located under one
of the car fenders and found that this identification number also
matched the VIN of the Mustang stolen from State Auto Sales (R.
271-73, 276).

-5-

At trial, defendant did not deny that the Mustang had
been stolen, but attempted to convince the jury that Mr. Luce had
misidentified him because he had incorrectly reported his weight
(R. 309-12).
The jury convicted defendant as charged of theft and of
possession of a stolen vehicle (R. 325).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the vehicle that he stole; therefore, he has no
standing to challenge the alleged search of the vehicle.

If

defendant is found to have standing, he nevertheless had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle identification
number and, further, probable cause existed to search the vehicle
without a warrant.
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion for
a mistrial, made following a brief conversation between a
peripheral witness and a juror.

After a complete hearing on

whether this contact would affect the case, the judge properly
concluded that the State had rebutted the presumption of
prejudice.
The record does not support defendant's claim that the
jury observed him in shackles in police custody, thus denying him
a fair trial.
Under the circumstances of this case, defendant was
properly convicted of theft and of possession of a stolen
vehicle.

-6-

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE STOLEN MUSTANG
WAS LAWFUL AND THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY
ADMITTED THE EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF
THE SEARCH.
A.

Defendant Does Not Have Standing to Challenge the
Search of the Vehicle.

The threshold question to defendant's claim that his
rights given by the fourth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution
were violated is whether defendant has standing to challenge the
search.2

In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978), the

United States Supreme Court held that a defendant has standing to
challenge a warrantless search only if he or she can establish a
"legitimate expectation of privacy" in the property searched.

A

defendant must "own or lawfully possess or control property" in
order to have a legitimate expectation of privacy,

jk*-

at

143 n.

12 (emphasis added).
Courts overwhelmingly agree that criminal defendants do
not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in vehicles they
have stolen.

For example, the Arizona Supreme Court declared, "A

thief of property has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
stolen goods.

And 'this court has refused to refused to

recognized as 'reasonable' any expectation of privacy a thief may
have in an automobile which he has stolen.'"

State v. Harding,

The "search" of the Mustang was extremely limited in scope and
extended only to opening the door in order to view the VIN
located on the safety inspection sticker lqcated on the right
side panel of the door (R. 235-37, 244).
-7-

670 P.2d 383, 396 (Ariz. 1983), cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1013
(1983) (citations omitted); State v. Schad, 633 P.2d 366 (Ariz.
1981).
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that a defendant who
has not shown that he "owned or had a right to possess" a car has
no standing to challenge the constitutionality of its search and
seizure.

State v. Bottelson, 625 P-2d 1093, 1095 (Idaho 1981);

accord State v. McKinney, 687 P.2d 570 (Idaho 1984).

The

Colorado Supreme Court has held that "[s]ince the evidence [in
the case] strongly points to the fact that the defendant stole
[the] vehicle, it must be concluded that he has no proprietary or
possessory interest in the vehicle upon which he can base
standing to challenge the legality of its search."

People v.

Pearson, 546 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Colo. 1976); People v. Spies, 615
P.2d 710 (Colo. 1980) . 3
This Court has also held that defendants do not have
standing to object to the search of vehicles they do not
rightfully possess.

In all three cases cited by defendant, this

Court denied standing to individuals who did not have legitimate
The majority of courts have similarly held that a thief of a
stolen vehicle has no standing to challenge a search of that
vehicle. See, e.g., Sanborn v. State, 304 S.E.2d 377 (Ga. 1983)
(defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in stolen
car); State v. Rivers, 420 S.2d 1128, 1132 (La. 1982) (because
vehicle was stolen, defendants "had no appropriate proprietary
interest in that automobile, they had no reason to expect any
privacy, and there was absolutely nothing wrong with the
warrantless search"); Graham v. State, 421 A.2d 1385 (Md.App.
1980) (defendant had no standing to object to search of stolen
moped and backpack); Burns v. State, 438 So. 2d 1347, 1351 (Miss.
1983) (defendant's claim of unlawful search rejected "because the
marijuana was found in a stolen automobile"); State v. White, 316
S.E.2d 42, 46 (N.C. 1984) ("defendant had no legitimate
expectations of privacy in the stolen vehicle").
-8-

possession of the vehicles searched.

State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d

1334, 1335 (Utah 1984) (defendants who seek standing to challenge
a warrantless search must demonstrate legitimate expectation of
privacy ); State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441, 443 (Utah 1978) (facts
showed that defendant had no possessory or proprietary interest;
State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah 1966)
(defendant had no standing because he did n0t establish that he
owned, or had legitimate possession of the car).
In the present case, Detective Rofrison testified that
upon being arrested, defendant claimed that he had purchased the
Mustang from Streater Chevrolet in the Summer of 1984 (R. 239).
Defendant made no efforts to substantiate this claim at any time,
although he had ample opportunity to do so.

Testimony given by a

defendant in support of a motion to suppress evidence on fourth
amendment grounds cannot be utilized by the prosecution at trial
to establish a defendant's guilt.
U.S. 377 (1968).

Simmons v. United States, 390

Thus, defendant had the opportunity to be

completely open at the pretrial hearing and not have the evidence
used against him.

If defendant had, in faqt, purchased the car

from Streater Chevrolet in the Summer of 1984, it would have been
a rather simple matter to support this claim in some form during
the hearing on the motion to suppress.

Defendant contends,

however, that his unsubstantiated claim of ownership entitles him
to standing and that forcing him to support his claim would
require a defendant to establish the ultimate issue in the case.
The rule of virtually every court in this nation today
is that evidence resulting from a police search is admissible
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unless the accused establishes that his legitimate expectation of
privacy was violated.
suffice.

Mere allegations of ownership do not

In Rakas the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he proponent

of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing that his
own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged
search or seizure."
the defendants' claim

439 U.S. 131 n. 1. The Rakas court rejected
because they made "no showing that they

had any legitimate expectation of privacy" in the searched
vehicle.

Id,, at 148. See also Rawlins v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98/

104 (1980) (the defendant must prove not only that the search was
illegal, but also that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the object searched); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83,
92 (1980) (no valid fourth amendment claim absent "a factual
finding" that defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy
in the area searched); United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788,
790 (10th Cir. 1984) (fourth amendment claim regarding search of
airplane depended upon whether the defendant "sufficiently showed
lawful possession or control to confer standing," and was
dismissed because he had "failed to show lawful possession of the
plane giving rise to a legitimate expectation of privacy");
United States v. Oregon, 748 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1984) (no
standing because defendant did not prove that he had legitimate
expectation of privacy in automobile); State v. Bottelson, 625
P.2d 1093, 1095 (Idaho 1981) ("defendant had the burden of
proving that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
[car]"); People v. Pearson, 190 Colo. 3132, 546 P.2d 1259, 1264
(Colo. 1976) (to Hestabli8h standing to challenge a Bearch and
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seizure, the challenger has the burden of alleging and proving
that he has a reasonable expectation of privacy").
In State v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 414 P.2d 958 (Utah
1966), this Court also held that evidence seized is admissible
unless the accused establishes that his rights were violated.
M

[I]t is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge

he legality of a search as a basis for suppressing relevant
evidence that he alleges, and if the allegation be disputed that
he establish, that he himself was a victim of an invasion of
privacy."

JId. at 960.

Further, in State y. Constantino, 732

P.2d 125 (Utah 1987); State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1334 (Utah 1984);
nor State v. Purcell, 586 P.2d 441 (Utah 1978), this Court has
made no indication that it would be reluctant to follow the wellsettled rule that a defendant must prove that he has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the object searched.
Defendant attempts to distinguish the Utah cases in
which this Court found that the defendants did not have standing
by stating that the officers established prior to the search that
the defendants did not own or have a possessory interest in the
property seized (Br. of App. at 9). In the present case, before
the officers opened the door to look at the VIN on the safety
inspection sticker, the officers had significant reason to
believe that the car was stolen (see subsection B, infra).
Regardless, whether a defendant has standing to object should not
depend on the officer's belief regarding the thief's right to
possession in the vehicle.
1974).

State v. Boutot, 325 A.2d 34 (Me.

The reasonableness of the officer's belief that the car
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was stolen would be of consequence only when reaching the merits
of defendant's claim.

Whether defendant has standing depends on

his own expectation of privacy.

Accord People v. Spies, 615 P.2d

710 (Colo. 1980).
In the present case, defendant had no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the Mustang that he had stolen.
Although he made an assertion to Detective Robison that he had
purchased the vehicle from a local dealership, he made no further
effort to establish his claim during his attempt to suppress the
evidence.

A mere, unsupported statement of ownership is not

sufficient to establish standing.

When this unsupported claim is

weighed against the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, it
is clear that defendant did not establish his standing to
challenge the officer's opening of the car door in order to view
the VIN on the door side panel. Accordingly, defendant's claim
of unlawful search and seizure should be dismissed for want of
standing.
B.

Assuming Defendant Has Standing to Challenge
The Search of the Vehicle, the Warrantless Search
Was Still Lawful.

If this Court finds that defendant has standing to
challenge the constitutionality of the search, defendant is not
entitled to the relief he seeks because the officer's search
(specifically opening the door to compare the VIN located on the
safety standard sticker side panel of the door) falls within the
automobile exception of the warrant requirement of the fourth
amendment.

See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1974);

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United
States, 237 U.S. 132 (1925).
-12-

In California v. Carney. 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985), the
United States Supreme Court reviewed its former automobile
exception cases and stated that the rule was originally based
upon the readily movable nature of automobiles, citing Carroll.
The Court noted that an additional basis for the exception exists
because one's expectation of privacy in an automobile is
significantly less than one's expectation of privacy in a home or
office, citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 42^ U.S. 364 (1976).
Id. at 391.

The lesser expectation of privacy does not derive

only from the fact that the interior of a vehicle is usually in
plain view, but also from the fact that there is "pervasive
regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public
highways."

Ici. at 392.

The reduced expectation of privacy stems

in part from government regulation of vehicles which does not
extend to a fixed dwelling.
Relying upon the premise that automobiles are
justifiably the subject of pervasive regulation by the state, the
United States Supreme Court recently held that the VIN of an
automobile, which by law is present either inside the door jamb
or atop the dashboard, is not subject to a reasonable expectation
of privacy.

In New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113 (1986), the

Court stated:
The factors that generally diminish the
reasonable expectation of privacy in
automobiles are applicable a fortiori to the
VIN. As we have discussed above, the VIN
plays an important part in the pervasive
regulation by the government of the
automobile. A motorist must surely expect
that such regulation will on occasion require
the State to determine the VIN of his or her
vehicle, and the individual's reasonable
-13-

expectation of privacy in the VIN is thereby
diminished.
After having established that a VIN is not subject to a
reasonable expectation of privacy, the Court went on to state
that when the VIN is visible from outside of the vehicle, there
is no justification for intrusion into the passenger compartment
to see it.

Justice Powell addressed this seeming contradiction

in his concurring opinion stating, "an officer's efforts to
observe the [VIN] need not be subjected to the same scrutiny that
courts properly apply when police have intruded into a vehicle to
arrest or to search for evidence of crime."

Id. at 120.

In the present case, Detective Robison received a call
from the owner of a stolen vehicle (R. 230). She went to the
location of the vehicle and ran a check on the license number.
As a result of the check, the officer learned that the vehicle
was registered to defendant (R. 233). After receiving further
information from the owner, i.e., that the car had distinctive
arm rests, tie downs on the hood, a black racing stripe on the
hood and sides of the car, and a scoop on the front of the car,
the detective returned to the car (R. 234). The detective and
Kipp Ingersoll noted the VIN on the dashboard and the car's
distinctive features and then opened the car door to determine if
the VIN on the dashboard matched the VIN on the safety standard
sticker on the door (R. 235). It is clear that the only reason
the detective entered the car was to examine the VIN.

Further,

Kip Ingersoll testified that there are usually two or more places
on the vehicle where the VIN is stamped (R. 269). In the present
case, the officers possessed information that a car had been
-14-

stolen, and the prior owner gave the officers a detailed
description of the vehicle.

The car examined by the officers

matched the description given by the owner, and the fact that the
VIN on the dashboard did not match the stolen vehicle made it
reasonable for the officers to verify the other VINs on the
vehicle.
Further, the warrantless search of the Mustang was
justified on the basis of probable cause.

A "warrantless vehicle

search is not invalid under the Fourth Amendment if probable
cause for a search exists."

State v. Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085 (Utah

1986).
Probable cause exists where "the facts and
circumstances within [the officers's]
knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in
themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that" an offense has
been or is being committed.
(Citing Brineqar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 175-76.)
The determination of whether probable cause
exists, therefore, depends upon an
examination of all the information available
to the searching officer in light of the
circumstances as they existed at the time the
search was made. The trial court's findings
as to the facts and circumstances pertaining
to probable cause will not be overturned on
appeal unless it appears that the trial court
clearly erred.
J^l. at 1088.
Based upon the following facts, probable cause existed
to search the vehicle:

1) the owner of a vehicle reported that

his car had been stolen and that he thought it was located at
7242 Gardenia Avenue (R. 230-31), 2) he provided police officers
with a description of the car: a gold, yellpw Mach I Mustang with
-15-

black racing stripes (R. 231), armrests which had been "redone"
and which were "very distinctive from the rest of the car," a
black racing stripe on the hood of the car, a "scoop" on the hood
of the car, and "tie-downs" on the hood (R. 234); and 3) a Mach I
Mustang matching the above description was found at 7242 Gardenia
Avenue (R. 232-34).

The officers were confronted with a dilemma

in the instant case, the description given by the owner of the
stolen vehicle matched the vehicle located at 7242 Gardenia
Avenue; however, the VIN on the dashboard did not match that of
the stolen vehicle.

Faced with this dilemma, the officers had

probable cause to simply open the door for the limited purpose of
determining whether the VIN on the safety standard sticker
located on the right side panel of the door matched the VIN on
the dashboard.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court's analysis
of exigent circumstances set forth in Carney, which held that a
mobile home parked on a public street came within the automobile
exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement, justifies
the warrantless search for the VIN on the door of the Mustang in
the present case.
When a vehicle is being used on the highways,
or if it is readily capable of such use and
is found stationary in a place not regularly
used for residential purposes—temporary or
otherwise—the two justifications for the
vehicle exception come into play. First the
vehicle is obviously readily mobile by the
turn of an ignition key, if not actually
moving. Second, there is a reduced
expectation of privacy stemming from its use
as a licensed motor vehicle subject to a
range of police regulation inapplicable to a
fixed dwelling. At least in these
circumstances, the overriding societal
-16-

interests in effective law enforcement
justify an immediate search before the
vehicle and its occupants become unavailable.
Carney, at 393 (footnote omitted).
Federal cases subsequent to Carney have given a broad
interpretation to the fourth amendment by allowing warrantless
searches of automobiles if the search is reasonable in scope and
supported by probable cause.

See, e.g., United States v.

Grandstaff, 807 F.2d 851, 856 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Hepperle, 810 F.2d 836, 840 (8th Cir. 1987) (in which the court
rejected the defendant's argument that no exigent circumstances
existed because the automobile was in disrepair and was incapable
of being moved, finding that probable cause is all that is
necessary to justify a warrantless search); State v. Badgett, 200
Conn. 412, 512 A.2d 160, 169 (Conn. 1986); State v. Akers, 723
S.W.2d 9, 13 (Mo. App. 1986).
In the present case, the Mustang was readily capable of
being moved by the mere turn of a key.
used for residential purposes.

It was clearly not being

The scope of the search was

limited to locating the VIN on the door and did not constitute an
intrusion into the interior of the vehicle,
Defendant also argues that although article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution is almost identical to the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution, this Court could
nevertheless extend the protections of the Utah Constitution to
the fact of this case.

Even if this Court finds that the

automobile exception requires both probable cause and exigent
circumstances, as demonstrated above, both prongs were met.
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There is no legitimate basis to extend the protection of the Utah
Constitution beyond what the Supreme Court ruled in California v.
Carney and New York v. Class that the Supreme Court ruled the
fourth amendment provides.
Because defendant had no expectation of privacy in the
VIN, and furthermore because probable cause existed to search the
car, the search of the vehicle was lawful.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
SHORT CONTACT BETWEEN A JUROR AND ONE OF THE
STATE'S WITNESSES DID NOT WARRANT GRANTING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL.
Defendant contends that the trial court committed
reversible error by not granting his motion for mistrial after
one of the jurors, Agnes Lembke, conversed with a prosecution
witness, Neil Hailes.
According to the standard set forth by this Court in
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985) , an unauthorized
encounter between a witness and a juror that is "more than brief
and inadvertent" raises a presumption of prejudice to the
defendant which the State must rebut.

It is not sufficient to

rebut the presumption of prejudice for the affected juror to
simply state that he or she would not be influenced.
see State v. Erickson, 749 P.2d 620, 621 (Utah 1987).

Id.

at 281;

However,

the prosecution can rebut the presumption by a showing that the
contact did not influence the juror.

Factors to be considered

include the importance of the witness to the prosecution's case,
the nature and length of the conversation, and whether the
content of the conversation and the trial court's questioning of
-18-

those involved regarding its effect is contained in the record in
order to afford adequate appellate review.

Pike at 280.

The facts of the present case are distinguishable from
those in Pike and Erickson; the juror-witness contact in the
present case did not constitute the degree of impropriety that
warrants the drastic remedy of a new trial.
In Pijce, the unauthorized juror-witness contact
involved an important witness for the prosecution, Officer
Fleming.

Fleming was a witness to many of the occurrences

between the victims and the defendant (who was charged with
aggravated assault), including a threatening statement the
defendant directed toward the victims; he w£s also the arresting
officer.

Consequently, his testimony was critical to the jury's

determination of the defendant's guilt.

This Court noted that

because the officer was an important witness and his credibility
was a crucial aspect of the State's case, a conversation between
the officer and a juror concerning the officer's injury raised a
presumption of prejudice.

The record on appeal did not disclose

the entire content of the conversation; the questioning of those
involved was brief and incomplete.

Under those facts, the bare

statement of the jurors involved that they would not be affected
was insufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice against
the defendant.

See also Erickson, at 620 (juror's conversation

with a State's witness, a police officer, discussing family
members and the officer's feelings toward her job raised a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice).

The witness' status was

important to this Court's decision in Pike# that is, the witness
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was "important" to the case and the witness—a police officer—
was a person of authority.
The record of the proceedings below reflects that just
prior to trial, after the jury had been selected, some of the
4
jurors were waiting outside the courtroom.
Witness Hailes
walked over to where juror Agnes Lembke was sitting in order to
share an ashtray that she was using (R. 164-65).

A brief,

"general conversation" ensued in which Mr. Hailes told Ms. Lembke
that he planned to go to Eureka and hoped that the trial would
not last too long (R. 164-65).

Mr. Hailes also expressed

surprise that none of the jurors had raised their hands when
asked during voir dire whether they believed that police officers
were more believable than other witnesses, and Hailes indicated
that he would probably have raised his hand had he been asked
that question (R. 166). Nothing further appears to have been
said between the two.
It is apparent from the record that Judge Dee was aware
of this Court's ruling in Pike and knew that where the jurorwitness contact is more than merely incidental, the State must
rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendant (see R. 33435).

The record reflects that the State rebutted this

presumption through the questioning of those involved (R. 33842).
Based upon the following factors, the trial court
reasonably concluded that the State had rebutted the presumption
4
The record of the inquiry made by the trial court regarding the
juror-witness contact is reproduced in its entirely in Appendix
A.
-20-

of prejudice.

First, a major distinction between the present

case and Pike lies in the nature of the testimony offered by the
witness who had come into contact with the juror.

In Pike,

Officer Fleming was an "important" prosecution witness.
280.

:id. at

Mr. Hailes testimony, on the other h>and, was virtually

inconsequential to the outcome of the case.

His testimony merely

confirmed that the Mustang in defendant's possession had been
stolen, an issue that was not contested at trial.

Further, he

was not a witness to either of the crimes charged.

Defendant

conceded that the car was stolen (R. 312-13), but argued that
David Luce, the salesman from State Auto Sales, had misidentified
him as the man who had taken the vehicle (R. 310-12).

The

substance of Mr. Hailes' testimony was never challenged.

As the

prosecutor stated, Mr. Hailes was an "incidental witness" whose
testimony "simply rounded out the story so that the jury would
get the entire picture" (R. 341). Mr. Hailes was not the victim
in this case, he had never met or been wronged by the defendant,
he was not at the scene of the crime, and he did not appear to
have an interest in the outcome of the case.

Under these

circumstances, the trial court reasonably concluded that the
contact between Ms. Lembke and Mr. Hailes was not prejudicial.
Furthermore, Hailes was not a police officer or a
person of similar authority likely to unduly influence a juror.
5
In Pike, the defendant was charged with three counts of
aggravated assault, and there was conflicting testimony regarding
the events that had transpired at the scene of the crime.
Officer Fleming "was both the arresting officer at the scene of
the altercation," and he heard the defendant make incriminating
statements to the effect that he would "take care of" the assault
victims.
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From the juror's perspective, Hailes was simply a fellow who had
gotten drunk one night and demolished his 1973 Mustang.

Hailes

and Lembke merely conversed briefly while sharing an ashtray.

It

is unlikely that such a brief encounter with an insignificant
witness had any impact on Lembke's decision.
Mr. Hailes' personal observation that police officers
were more credible than others, would not have impacted the
credibility of Detective Robison and Kipp Ingersoll because
neither person's testimony was disputed at trial.

Robison and

Ingersoll established that the VIN tag on the dashboard of the
Mustang was unlawfully attached, that the car was stolen, and
that it was found in the possession of the defendant (R. 230-49,
265-86).

Nothing that Robison or Ingersoll said detracted from

defendant's claim that he had been misidentified as the thief and
that he did not know the car was stolen.

Because police officer

credibility was not at issue in this case, the trial court had
additional justification to find that defendant had not been
prejudiced by the brief conversation between Ms. Lembke and Mr.
Hailes.

Ms. Lembke's denial that her conversation with Mr.

Hailes influenced her, along with the fact that Hailes was not a
key prosecution witness and was not in a position to influence
Ms. Lembke, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of prejudice
resulting from the contact.

See State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89,

97-98 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J., concurring).
Another important distinction between Pike and the
present case is that here the relevant matters were fully aired
in the court below.

In Pike, this Court expressed concern that
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the "questioning [of the officer] was brief and did not disclose
the entire contents of the conversation." 712 P.2d at 280. The
police officer began to tell the trial court in chambers about
the discussion with the jurors; he informed the court that he and
the jurors had discussed his accident but he was then interrupted
by the court and not allowed to finish his Narrative of the
conversation.

2^#

at

279.

There was "no other evidence as to

the scope and subject matter of the conversation."

Jki. at 280.

It appears to have been a critical factor in this Court's
reversal of the conviction that the record was not sufficient to
determine whether the defendant had been prejudiced as a result
of the encounter between Officer Fleming and the jurors.
deficiencies were not present in the instant case.

Such

Juror Lembke

was questioned in considerable deta:.l by the trial court, by the
prosecutor and by defense counsel (see Appendix A).
party had any further questions for Ms. Lembke.

Neither

She said all

that she could say, and the record adequately supports the
conclusion that defendant was not prejudicqd.
Moreover, while they were not entirely dispositive, Ms.
Lembke's statements to the court were significant.

She said that

she and Mr. Hailes had not discussed the facts of the case at all
(R. 165). She declared that she would remain unbiased towards
either side, that she would not accord any greater weight to Mr.
Hailes' testimony than to that of other witnesses, and that the
comment regarding the testimony of police dfficers would not
affect her deliberations in any way (R. 168). The trial court,
who observed her demeanor as she answered the questions put to
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her, was uniquely capable of determining whether she had been
influenced by the contact with Mr. Hailes, and his conclusion
that there was no need to grant a mistrial was proper.
The record is devoid of evidence to support defendant's
contention that a juror, in addition to Ms. Lembke, "stood nearby
and apparently heard at least a portion of the conversation" (Br.
of App. at 27). The record establishes that this second juror—a
young, unnamed, blonde-haired woman who had been sitting next to
Ms. Lembke—was not present when the encounter between Ms. Lembke
and Mr. Hailes took place.
sitting next to me there.

Ms. Lembke told Judge Dee, "The girl
As he [Mr. Hailes] was walking up to

use the ashtray, she left, and he used the ashtray" (R. 167).
The record simply does not support defendant's claim that the
second juror heard any portion of the conversation; to infer
otherwise, would be mere speculation.

The trial court appeared

to be satisfied that there was no need to question any juror
other than Ms. Lembke (see R. 164-69).

If defendant believed

that this second juror had been in contact with Mr. Hailes,
defendant should have requested that the judge take the juror
into chambers and question her as he had Ms. Lembke, thus
clearing the air of any impropriety.

Defense counsel did not do

so, however, and counsel's failure to timely raise the issue
precludes doing so on appeal

State v. Steqqell, 660 P.2d 252,

254 (Utah 1983).
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POINT III
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONTENTION THAT JURORS SAW HIM IN SHACKLES OR
UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH OTHERWISE DENIED
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.
Defendant contends that during the noon recess prior to
the jury beginning deliberations, two jurors saw defendant
"shackled and in police custody" (Br. of App. at 30). Defendant
likens this alleged viewing of defendant's restraint to the
prejudice which follows a "situation in which the defendant is
brought into court with prison garb or shackles on" (Br. of App.
at 30).
The record simply does not support defendant's
contention.

On the final day of trial, after closing arguments

and prior to deliberation, the trial court allowed the jury to be
taken to lunch, accompanied by the bailiff (R. 321-22).

After

the jury returned its verdict and prior tofreingexcused, at
defense counsel's request, the trial court Risked the jurors
whether they had seen defendant in police custody when leaving
for lunch (R. 327-28).

One juror, Ms. Bragg, stated that she

saw him with a man wearing a suit but did not see him get into a
police car (R. 328). Another juror, Ms. Broadhead, while sitting
in the back of a station wagon on the way to the restaurant saw
defendant approaching the car (R. 328). Contrary to defendant's
representations, nothing in the record indicates that defendant
was shackled or in police custody; nothing indicates that the man
wearing a "suit" was wearing a police uniform.

The record does

The transcript of relevant proceedings is contained in its
entirety as Appendix B.
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not evince that the car defendant was approaching was a police
car, or, that if it was a police car, that it was identified as
such.

Finally, the record does not show that defendant was

handcuffed, much less shackled, or that if he were handcuffed,
the jurors saw, or were in a position to see, the handcuffs.

It

is clear that defendant, himself, was wearing plain clothes—not
prison garb—during the proceedings (R. 332).
Had the jurors seen defendant in prison garb and
shackles, being escorted by uniformed guards to a marked police
vehicle, there might have been an issue as to whether his right
to a fair trial had been violated.
in the present case.

However, this did not occur

Defendant, who was in plain clothes, was

seen briefly as he walked with a man wearing a suit down some
stairs and in the direction of a vehicle which may or may not
have borne police markings.

The evidence against defendant was

overwhelming, and both of the jurors involved stated that their
seeing defendant on that occasion had no effect upon their
7
deliberations (R. 328-29).
7
Assuming this Court accepts defendant's representations of the
record, defendant's argument nonetheless lacks merit. Defendant
relies on Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Chess v.
Smith, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 1980) and People v. Duran, 545 P.2d
1322 (Cal. 1976) to support his contention that a mistrial should
have been granted. Estelle v. Williams and Chess v. Smith are
cases in which the defendants were required to wear prison
clothes during trial and are, therefore, distinguishable. In
People v. Duran, the Supreme Court of California stated that a
brief observation by jurors of a defendant in shackles either
inside or outside the courtroom does not generally constitute
prejudicial error. Accord Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101 (6th
Cir. 1973). The Duran court found prejudicial error where the
defendant was seen shackled by the jurors in the courtroom
throughout the course of the trial. In the present case,
defendant was at no time required to appear in court in shackles.
The Duran court also noted that although "an accused is entitled
•26-

Defendant'8 constitutional right to a fair trial
bestowed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution were not violated.

Th^re simply was no

impropriety on any level, and certainly not a trial defect which
rises to the level of a constitutional violation of his right to
a fair trial.

If this Court were to find a constitutional

violation, it is clear that any error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

State v. Hackford, 737 p.2d 200 (Utah 1987).
POINT IV

DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF BOTH
THEFT AND POSSESSION OF A STOLEN MOTOR
VEHICLE UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Defendant was charged with theft of a vehicle pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) which states:

"A person

commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control
over the property of another with a purpose to deprive him
thereof."

As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1978), theft

of an "operable motor vehicle" is a second degree felony.
Defendant was also charged with possession of a stolen vehicle
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 41-1-112 (1981) which states:
Any person who, with intent to procure or
pass title to a vehicle which he knows or has
reason to believe has been stolen or
unlawfully taken, receives, or transfers
possession of the same from or to another, or
who has in his possession any vehicle which
7

Cont. to appear during the progress of his trial free of
shackles, . . . it was permissible to transport the prisoner to
court in handcuffs and to keep him in such restraints until he
entered the court room." Ici. at 1326. See also United States v.
Larkin, 417 F.2d 617 (1st Cir. 1969) (no prejudicial error when a
juror shared an elevator with the defendant while the defendant
was handcuffed and in the custody of a United States marshall);
O'Shea v. United States, 400 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1968).
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he knows or has reason to believe has been
stolen or unlawfully taken, and who is not an
officer of the law engaged at the time in the
performance of his duty as such officer, is
guilty of a felony.
Defendant argues that he was erroneously convicted of
both theft of a vehicle and possession of the stolen vehicle,
contending that the latter was a lesser-included offense of the
theft charge.

He also claims that the trial court committed

reversible error in failing to give a lesser-included offense
instruction to the jury; specifically, that possession of a
stolen vehicle is a lesser-included offense of theft in this
case.
A.

Defendant Was Properly Convicted of Theft and
Possession of a Stolen Vehicle.

Defendant claims that this Court's interpretation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-402(3) (a) (1978) as set-forth in State v.
Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983), serves to preclude his
convictions on theft of a vehicle and possession of a stolen
vehicle because under the criteria in Hill his possession of the
stolen Mustang constituted a lesser-included offense of theft of
the vehicle (Br. of App. 34-35).

However, under the

circumstances of this case, defendant was properly convicted of
both theft and possession of a stolen vehicle.
A Hill analysis is not necessary under the
circumstances of this case since this case involved two distinct
acts by defendant—one constituted theft and the other possession
of a stolen vehicle.

Whether a greater-lesser offense

relationship exists in a particular case under either Hill or
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) (which sets forth the
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test to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a requested
lesser-included offense instruction), is anl issue only where a
single act of the defendant is involved.

For example, in a

criminal homicide case the question may be whether the
defendant's single act of killing constituted second degree
murder or manslaughter (a lesser-included offense of second
degree murder).

If the defendant had committed two acts of

killing within a single criminal episode, one constituting second
degree murder and the other manslaughter, the defendant could not
successfully argue that, because the two offenses fall within the
greater-lesser offense relationship, he could be convicted of
only one offense.

It is clear that if Mthe crimes were a result

of separate and distinct acts that resulted in separate and
distinct crimes," a defendant may be convicted and sentenced for
each of the offenses arising out of a single criminal episode.
State v. O'Brien, 721 P.2d 896 (Utah 1986).

See also State v.

Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843 (Utah 1986); State v. Porter, 705 P.2d
1174, 1178 (Utah 1985).
Although defendant cites numerous cases holding that an
individual could not be convicted of both theft and possession,
the defendants in those cases were found in possession of stolen
goods not long after they had taken them.

The possession grew

out of, and was incidental to, the thefts involved.

However,

M

[w]hen there is evidence of complete divorcement between the

theft and a subsequent receiving, such as when the thief has
disposed of the property and subsequently receives it back in a
transaction separate from the original theft, conviction on both
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charges would be proper.M

People v. Jaramillo, 129 Cal. Rptr.

306, 548 P.2d 706, 710 n. 8 (Cal. 1976).

Accord People v.

Kyllonen, 402 Mich. 135, 262 N.W.2d 2 (Mich. 1978) (a sale or
transfer of stolen property by the thief marks the end of the
original crime).
In defendant's case, the information charged him with
two separate crimes on different dates:

theft on June 16, 1981,

and possession of a stolen vehicle on June 6, 1985.

The jury

instructions also alleged that defendant committed the theft on
June 16, 1981 (R. 69) and the crime of possession of stolen
property on June 6, 1985 (R. 70).
The victims of the two crimes are distinct.

Theft is a

violation of the criminal code; the victim was Mr. Padilla.
Possession of a stolen vehicle is a violation of the Motor
Vehicle Act and is a regulatory violation.

Further, the four

year gap between the theft charge and the possession charge in
the instant case precludes defendant's contention that the acts
derived from a single criminal episode.

As a result of this gap,

evidence presented to convict defendant of the theft charge
necessarily differed from that evidence presented to convict
defendant of possession four years later.

See State v. Branch,

743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987).
Proof adduced at trial established that defendant stole
the Mustang from State Auto Sales in June of 1981 (R. 185-89).
Defendant was imprisoned in the Utah State Prison sometime in the
next year or two, although the record does not disclose the exact
date, for stealing a truck valued at about $80,000 (R. 348). See
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also State v, Larocco, 665 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1983) (this same
defendant appealed his conviction for theft of the truck).
Defendant transferred the stolen Mustang to his brother-in-law
(R. 293) prior to entering prison.

Upon his release from prison

on February 12, 1985 (R. 348), defendant was seen driving the
stolen Mustang (R. 191, 348) and was later found in possession of
the car (R. 239). Defendant's conscious decision to again take
possession of the Mustang was an act additional to, and distinct
from, the original theft.

Thus, there was a "complete

divorcement" between the first and second crimes.

Jaramillo, at

710 n. 8.
In People v. Malmut, 16 Cal. App. 3d 237, 93 Cal. Rptr.
782 (Cal. 1971), the defendant was charged with and convicted of
committing separate transactions on different dates:

grand theft

on December 8, 1968, and a violation of the California vehicle
code, driving an automobile without the owner's permission, on
February 5, 1969.

The Malmut court stated^

Here, there was not only a lapse of a
substantial period of time (62 days), but
there was also a showing that the vehicle was
not being driven in one continuous journey
away from the locus of the theft. The
driving charge was in an entirely different
location and obviously for purposes
unconnected with the original taking.
Moreover, not only was there a switch in
license plates and registration slip, but
there was also a placement of the motor and
removal of the serial numbers from the body
of the car—combined operations which would
be considered a major alteration of the
vehicle.
Id. at 784.
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In Malmut the court found the defendant guilty of both
crimes based upon the lapse of time between the theft and when
the defendant was seen with the altered vehicle.

The present

case, in contrast, involves an even greater separation of the
acts of theft and possession wherein defendant actually
relinguished possession for a significant period of time and
regained possession at a later time.

Finding that the "crime of

theft by no means includes retention and possession of the stolen
goods for a period in excess of four years," the Utah Court of
Appeals held it was proper to allow the jury to convict defendant
on both charges.
B.

Larocco, 742 P.2d at 97.

The Trial Court Properly Refused Defendant's
Instruction That Possession of a Stolen Vehicle
is a Lesser-Included Offense of Theft of the
Vehicle.

Relying on State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983),
defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to
instruct the jury that possession of a stolen vehicle is a
lesser-included offense in this case.

This Court held in Baker

that the trial court is obligated to instruct on a lesserincluded offense only when "there is a rational basis for a
verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense."

j[d. at 159; Utah Code

Ann. S 76-1-402(4) (1978).
In the present case, the evidence presented at trial to
establish defendant's theft of the Mustang was not ambiguous or
subject to an alternative interpretation requiring the court to
instruct on the lesser-included offense of possession.

David

Luce positively identified defendant as the person who had been
-32-

at State Auto Sales on three occasions to talk with him about the
Mustang.

Immediately after the theft, he told the police and

others that defendant resembles Dom Delouise (R. 189-90); it is
apparent that the resemblance is striking (R. 300, 303). Luce
recognized defendant some four years later as soon as he saw
defendant in the showroom of Valley Ford (R. 190). He
unequivocably identified defendant at trial.

The only point of

identification of defendant on which Luce was apparently not
exact, was his apparent underestimation of defendant's weight.
Not only was Luce's identification of defendant extremely solid,
defendant was found to be in possession of the stolen car.

There

simply was no reasonable basis upon which to acquit defendant of
theft and convict only of possession of a stolen vehicle.
There must be a rational basis for acquitting a
defendant of a greater offense and convicting of a lesserincluded offense.

A defendant's "frivolous" contentions to the

contrary cannot support the assertion that the trial court erred
in not charging the jury on the lesser offense included.

See

State v. Brown, 694 P.2d 587 (Utah 1984) (Hall, J., dissenting).
Failure of the trial court to instruct the jury that,
based upon the facts in this case that possession of a stolen
vehicle is a lesser-included offense of theft of the vehicle some
four years earlier was not error.
new trial on this basis.

Defendant is not entitled to a

If this Court were to conclude that

defendant could not be convicted of both offenses—the crime of
theft and possession of a stolen vehicle as prohibited by the
motor vehicle code—the proper remedy woulcf be to order that the

-33-

possession charge be vacated.

In State v. Hill/ 674 P.2d 96, 98

(Utah 1983), this Court stated:
When a defendant has been improperly
convicted of both a greater and a lesser
offense, it is appropriate to regard the
conviction on the lesser offense as mere
surplusage, which does not invalidate the
conviction and sentence on the greater
offense. United States v. Howard, 507 F.2d
559 (8th Cir. 1974).
Accord Sundberg v. State, 636 P.2d 619, 621 (Alaska App. 1981);
People v. Jackson, 627 P.2d 741 (Colo. 1981).

In no event is

defendant entitled to have his theft conviction overturned.
Two separate situations involving lesser-included
offenses issues commonly arise.

In the first situation, the

defendant is charged with both the greater and the lesser
offense.

The jury is instructed as to the elements of both

offenses and finds the defendant guilty of both, when the
defendant could properly have been convicted of only one of the
offenses.

These were the circumstances in State v. Hill, 674

P.2d 96 (Utah 1983).

This Court found the proper remedy was to

invalidate the conviction for the lesser offense and affirm the
conviction for the greater.

JEd. at 98.

In the second situation,

the jury is improperly instructed, over the defendant's
objection, that it must either convict the defendant of the
greater offense or acquit him.

The jury, which has never been

allowed to consider the possibility that the defendant may have
been guilty of a lesser offense instead of the greater, convicts
the defendant of the greater offense.

These latter circumstances

arose in State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), and here the
defendant's remedy was to have his conviction for the greater
offense reversed and remanded.
-34-

Attempting to apply both Hill and Baker remedies to the
present case, defendant urges that he is entitled to have his
conviction on the lesser possession charge vacated and to have
the greater theft conviction remanded for retrial.

The present

case, however, in plainly a Hill-type case, where both the
greater and lesser offenses went to the jury, and the defendant
was convicted of both.

Baker is inapposite, and defendant's

attempts to gain a double remedy through the application of both
Hill and Baker are meritless.

At most, defendant is entitled to

have his conviction for possession vacated, and the theft
conviction affirmed.

Hill 674 P.2d at 98.
CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to affirm the trial court and to uphold the convictions for theft
and possession of a stolen vehicle.
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APPENDIX A

ASL

1

other c h a n c e s i f y o u w a n t t o look at m y c h a m b e r s

2

But w e ' l l b e in r e c e s s o n t h i s c a s e u n t i l 2 : 0 0 p . m .

3
4

later on.

(Whereupon, court recessed
at 12:15 p . m . a n d r e c o n v e n e d at 2 : 1 2 p . m . in c h a m b e r s

5 I Court a n d c o u n s e l

present.)

6

THE COURT:

7

H i , M r s . jLembke.

with

C o m e o n in.

T h e r e c o r d s h o u l d s h o w that M r s . L e m b k e , o n e

8

of the j u r o r s in t h e c a s e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , is i n c h a m b e r s

g

w i t h the l a w y e r f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t a n d the p r o s e c u t o r

10

because t h e r e w a s a n o b s e r v e d c o n v e r s a t i o n b e t w e e n the

11

juror a n d o n e o f the p e r s o n s out in the h a l l w h o is c a l l e d

12

as a w i t n e s s

13

raised a b o u t t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n , whetheif y o u t a l k e d v:ith this

14 w i t n e s s a b o u t

for the prosecution.

the case.

15

JUROR LEMBKE:

16

THE COURT:

17

A n d t h e r e is a q u e s t i o n

No.

What were you talking about,

if y o u d o n ' t m i n d us f i n d i n g o u t a b o u t it?

»

JUROR LEMBKE:

W e l l , first o f a l l , h e

19

p u l l e d t h e l i g h t s w i t c h in t h e h a l l a n d h a d m e n t i o n e d

20

it w o r k e d ,

21

h e just w a s s a y i n g h e h o p e d it d i d n ' t - - t h e c a s e

didnft

22

go long,

down

23

there, w h e r e I lived.

24

at a l l a b o u t t h e c a s e .

R

a n d t h e n h e d i d the o t h e r s w i t c h .

A n d then

that h e w a s g o i n g to E u r e k a , just d r i v i n g
Just general conversation.

THE COURT:

that

Nothing

Did you know who he was?

coo:

4m I

1
2

JUROR LEMBKE:
his sweater.

We shared an ashtray.

3
4

I thought I recognized

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, I don't

think

that t h e r e ' s a n y t h i n g e l s e a b o u t the c o n v e r s a t i o n as

5 I as t h a t ' s c o n c e r n e d .

It's a question of friendliness

6

w h a t e v e r that s o m e t i m e s r a i s e s a q u e s t i o n a b o u t w h a t

7

w o u l d t h i n k o f h i m as a w i t n e s s o r i f he w a s c a l l e d

8

not c a l l e d , w h a t e v e r .

9 I that sort o f

far

W e h a v e to be v e r y c a r e f u l

or
you

or

about

thing.

10 1

JUROR LEMBKE:

n I

T H E COURT:

I understand.

I guess what we ought to do

12

is i s o l a t e e v e r y b o d y

from everybody

in t e r m s o f

that

13

sort of t h i n g .

14

other e n d o f t h e h a l l , t h e C i t y end, w h i l e p e o p l e

15

out in the h a l l .

M a y b e the j u r o r s s h o u l d go d o w n to the
are

Y o u d o n ' t k n o w w h o they a r e , a n d I d o n ' t

16 know w h o they are. A n d that would end speculation.
17
18

Do y o u feel comfortable about

JUROR LEMBKE:

20

THE COURT:

Yes.

Okay.

A s long as that w a s

the substance of your conversation.

22
23

thing?

Otherwise - -

19

21

the w h o l e

JUROR LEMBKE:

Y e s . The case wasn't

m e n t i o n e d at a l l .

24

MR. H0RT0N:

Do y o u feel y o u can

26

be fair to b o t h s i d e s a n d n o t b e i n f l u e n c e d b y

the

still

1

c o n v e r s a t i o n o u t in t h e h a l l ?

2

JUROR LEMBKE:

Yes, because we didn't

31 talk about anything involving anything.
4

know w h y h e ' s h e r e .

I don't, y o u know, other than the

5 I fact h e is a w i t n e s s .
6 I

I h a v e n o idea,

MR. HORTON:

7

weigh h i s testimony

8

h e t e s t i f i e s a n d h e is s u b j e c t

9

so forth?

Do y o u feel y o u could

t h e s a m e as a n y otjher w i t n e s s e s i f
to c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n a n d

10

JUROR LEMBKE:

11

M S . REMAL:

12

Yes.

D o y o u f e e l as t h o u g h t h e

fact y o u h a d t h i s c o n v e r s a t i o n m a k e s h i m m o r e b e l i e v a b l e -

13

JUROR LEMBKE:

14

M S . REMAL:

15

I mean I donft

No.

- - because y o u already

talked to h i m ?

16

JUROR LEMBKE:

No.

17

He did mention one thing.

That he w a s

18

surprised at the questions that were asked.

W

he was - - he was surprised, and that he, himself, would

20

h a v e said, y e s , w h e n y o u a s k e d i f y o u w o u l d b e l i e v e a

21

policeman m o r e than any other person.

22

comment

23

judge asked if w e w o u l d believe a policeman more

than a n y

24

other p e r s o n , a n d h e s a i d h e p r o b a b l y w o u l d h a v e

raised

*

his hand.

that w a s m a d e .

And that

That w a s the only

A n d - - a n d I didn't - - w h e n the

—

—

—

—

—

—

» » ^ » ^ i »

M

» M » i . » » » » — — — — — i

—

1

THE COURT:

2

JUROR LEMBKE:

3

that would be his, you know - -

4
S

MS. REMAL:

—

1

II

•

Had he been a juror,

So you did have that bit of

Yeah.

He did say that.

I made no comment.
MS. REMAL:

Was there any other discussion

9

about the questions asked on jury selection or anything

10

like that?
JUROR LEMBKE:

11

No.

THE COURT:

Any other jurors there while

all of this was going on?
JUROR LEMBKE:

15

One.

16

next to me there.

17

she left, and he used the ashtray.
THE COURT:

19

JUROR LEMBKE:

The young lady on your left?
On my right.

The blonde.

(Indicating.)

21

THE COURT:

22

JUROR LEMBKE:

23

walking by.

24

before - -

26

The girl sitting

As he was walking up to use the ashtray,

18

20

And he asked me if

I had ever served on a jury before, and I said, "No."

13
14

'

If he had been a juror?

JUROR LEMBKE:

8

12

1

conversation concerning the jury selection?

6
7

—

Okay.
Or she left just as he was

The one right there.

THE COURT:

VJe were out there

Okay.

1

30

MR. HORTON:

The comment that he made to

you about the police officer, would that affect your
deliberation in any way?
JUROR LEMBKE:
THE COURT:

No.

Okay.

Thank you.

You can

sit back in the jury box.
(Whereupon, Juror Lembke
left the chambers.)
Miss Remal, you can make your motion.
MS. REMAL:
for a mistrial.

Your Honor, I would move

I'm sure that Mrs. Lembke didn't mean

anything by her conversation with the witness, but I'm
still concerned that there was a little bit of conversation
pertaining to the case, at least to the jury selection,
that went on, and the comment about him saying that he
would have answered the question differently than she
apparently did.

I'm just a little concerned there may be

some influence depending on that.

And as I said before,

the fact that she had this conversation with him, I'm
afraid that even though not consciously she may just find
him more believable because she may think he's a nice guy,
having had this conversation.

And I'm a little bit

concerned about that.
THE COURT:
MR. HORTON:

Mr. Horton?
From the limited conversation

JLL

1

they h a d and the fact she's b e e n in h e r e and questioned

2

about it, my i m p r e s s i o n w o u l d be if anything she w o u l d

3

try to c o m p e n s a t e in favor o f the d e f e n s e .

4

think there's a b a s i s for a m i s t r i a l , so w e w o u l d oppose

A n d I don't

5I the m o t i o n at this time.
6

THE C O U R T :

My p e r c e p t i o n of the

7

c o n v e r s t a t i o n ' s content and the response of the juror to

g

the q u e s t i o n s about the c o n v e r s a t i o n leads the Court to

9 I believe there's no basis for a m i s t r i a l .
M o t i o n is denied.

10

M S . REMAL:

Well -

THE COURT:

I guess w e can do - -

,3

M S . REMAL:

Do it?

14 I

THE COURT:

I g u e s s We can go do it.

11
12

I

15

Wait.

16

Wait.

Wait.

M S . REMAL:

Y o u r Honor, I w o u l d like to

17

renew my M o t i o n to Supress the evidence that was taken as

18

a r e s u l t of the s e a r c h o f the car on tne day of M r . L a r o c c o ' s

19

a r r e s t a n d j u s t m a k e it clear to the court there's a

20

continuing o b j e c t i o n to the e v i d e n c e obtained as a result

2i

of that search, so I don't have to jump up and down through

22

the t r i a l .

23

THE COURT:

M o t i o n is d e n i e d , and the

24 I r u l i n g o f the C o u r t y o u a l r e a d y h a v e .
26

M S . REMAL:

T h a n k yop.

Kr

^

APPENDIX B
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decided by this jury.
I appreciate your being here for the purpose
of this experience and on behalf of the citizens of the
community, we wish to thank you for your participation.
You've done a good job listening to the evidence it
appeared to me.

I don't know anything about your job in

the deliberation room or make no comment on how you make
a determination on the verdict, but I think you were
attentive, and that's what counts.

You have proven again

the system at least can be employed to make a determination
to find the truth.

And I appreciate your participation.

The jury is excused.
MS. REMAL:

Thank you very much.

Excuse mfe, Your Honor.

Before you excuse the jury, may Mr. Horton and I approach
the bench?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Whereupon, there was a
discussion off the record between Court and counsel at the
bench, out of the hearing of the jury.)
Counsel have raised an issue, and I need to
explore it with you, ladies and gentlemen.
The defendant indicates that during the time
of the noon recess when you were leavipg to go to lunch,
while the bailiff had you in custody, he took you down to
a place where the defendant was entering a police car,

i;<j'or:7

£L

1

showing that he was in custody.

2

of you saw that.

3

should have made sure that situation didn't occur.

*

what the complaint is.

5
6

And I wondered whether any

I suppose what I'm saying is the bailiff
That's

Any of you see the defendant getting into a
police car?

7

JUROR BRAGG:

I saw him, but I didn't

8

see him go get into a police car.

9

but he was with a guy with a suit on.

10

THE COURT:

11

JUROR BRAGG:

12

JUROR BROADHEAD:

I saw him go downstairs,

Just walking down the stairs?
Yeah.
I saw him when he

13

was approaching the car.

14

him, but we were sitting in the back of a station wagon

15

facing that way.

16 I
17

I probably wouldn't have seen

THE COURT:

You were sitting in the back

of the station wagon?

18

JUROR BROADHEAD:

19

THE COURT:

20

THE BAILIFF:

21

THE COURT:

22
23

Uh^huh.

Whose station wagon is that?
This lady here.
Oh.

(Indicating.

You rode over to the

China Village?
THE BAILIFF:

Yeah.

They didn't want

24 I to freeze their toes.
25

JUROR BROADHEAD:

That's the only way I

coo;r:s

.

1

felL

saw him.

2

THE COURT:

Did that have any influence

3 on your determination in this case?
4
S

You're shaking your head, Miss Bragg.
have any effect - -

6

JUROR BRAGG:

7

THE COURT:

8

It didn't

No.
- - on your decision in the

case, influence your deliberations?

9

JUROR BRAGG:
THE COURT:

10

No.

Miss Broadhead, how about

11 you?
12

JUROR BROADHEAD:

13

THE COURT:

No.

Anyone else see him get into

14 a police car?

All right.

IS

You're excused.

Thank you.

(Whereupon, the jury was

16
17 excused at 3:54 p.m.)
18
19

THE COURT:

What dq you want to do about

MS. REMAL:

Your Honor, Mr. Larocco has

sentencing?

20
21

indicated that he would prefer to be sentenced at a later

22

date.

23

THE COURT:

Okay.

24

MS. REMAL:

We ask that a pre-sentence

2*

report be prepared.
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